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ABSTRACT 
 
This study is an exploration into the choice of independent accountants made by 
industrial initial public offering (IPO) companies in Australia between the years 1994 
to 2004. The aim of this research is to determine which companies are more likely to 
use one of the Top 5 accountancy firms and in so doing we seek to offer some insight 
into understanding the likelihood of IPO companies adopting the services of the big 
accounting firms.  Our findings show, as predicted, that the majority of industrial IPO 
companies, and particularly the larger companies, used one of the Top 5 accountancy 
firms as their independent accountant.  However, unexpected was that certain industry 
types were less likely to hire a Top 5 accounting firm for their independent accounting 
services compared to other industry categories.  Our studies also found that after the 
year 2000 a smaller percentage of companies used independent accountants than 
between 1994 and 1999.  Many factors contribute to the selection of an independent 
accountant and this paper provides some understanding of identified factors and the 
influence that they have over the choice of independent accountants by industrial 
company IPOs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Initial public offerings (IPOs) are issues of shares to the public for the first time 
with those companies subsequently seeking to be listed on a stock exchange. As such, 
these companies aspire to give information about them in a reassuring and positive 
manner so that the best vantage point can be attained to attract potential investors. The 
main avenue for communication of information to the public is the prospectus. 
Alongside information such as the history, future plans, management and financial 
position of the company, a prospectus includes a report from an independent 
accounting firm endorsing whether or not the financial information contained in the 
prospectus ‘presents fairly’ 1 . It can be hypothesised that the reputation of the 
accounting firm is an important consideration for IPOs because the public may be 
more likely to trust the opinions of, and the association with, the more reputable 
accountancy firms. As a result, IPOs may be more likely to use one of the Top 5 
accounting firms as their independent accountant.  
 Accounting firms have been under much scrutiny following the implication of 
accountants in the demise of companies such as Enron, HIH, One-Tel, Harris Scarfe, 
and World Com.  Prior to the demise of Arthur Andersen in 2002, the Top 5 firms 
accounting firms consisted of Arthur Andersen, Deloitte and Touché, Ernst and 
Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers.  It is these accounting firms that we 
refer to in this paper as the Top 5 accounting firms.  The Top 5 accounting firms, prior 
to the Arthur Andersen collapse, were highly regarded and had a hold on being the 
most reputable of accountancy firms. Companies used the ‘name’ of the Top 5 
accounting firm to provide credibility and assurance to their shareholders.  Not only 
do IPOs face stringent regulatory compliance and reporting requirements, but they 
also strive to attract and reassure potential investors in their investment decision.  The 
hiring of a Top 5 independent accountant is one way that an IPO can help ease the 
anxiety of potential investors. 
This paper adopts some findings from earlier studies conducted exploring the 
connection between IPOs using one of the big accounting firms and the perceived 
credibility of the IPO (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Rock, 1986; Beatty 1989; Menon and 
Williams, 1991; Holland and Horton, 1993; How et al., 1995; Hogan, 1997; Firth and 
Liau-Tan, 1998; Willenborg, 1999; Henry et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2003).  This study 
expands from those earlier studies and explores industrial IPOs between 1994 and 
                                            
1 The independent accountant’s report, also referred to as the investigating accountant’s report, is ordinarily in 
the form of a review rather than an audit. The independent accountant usually uses the historical financial 
information and the pro-forma historical information included in the prospectus to perform the review and to 
compile the review statement. 
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2004 to analyse what, when and why IPOs are more likely to use one of the Top 5 
accounting firms as their independent accountant.. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses some 
related IPO accountancy firm literature. Section 3 is a report of the findings. Section 4 
contains our conclusions. 
 
RELATED LITERATURE 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) explain that IPOs exhibit some uncertainty about their 
value before listing.  As such, IPOs would be expected to reassure their potential 
investors that they are a sound and safe investment while also aiming to gain the best 
price possible for their shares. Beatty and Ritter (1986) also argue that underpricing, 
the difference between the closing market price on the first day of trading and the 
initial offering price, is directly related to uncertainty and is what IPO companies 
would want keep to a miminum.   
How et al. (1995) explored the impact that the reputation of the investigating 
accountant, the underwriter and the expert has on underpricing for 340 industrial IPOs 
over the period of 1980 to 1990, found that “larger firms tend to hire higher reputation 
investigating accountants and experts”, and continue on to state that “IPOs associated 
with high reputation investigating accountants and experts have lower ex ante 
uncertainty surrounding the aftermarket issue price” (p.101).   
Firth and Liau-Tan (1998) purport that credibility of new share issues is linked to 
the choice of audit firm and further add that “high quality auditors are associated with 
higher IPO market valuations and they allow entrepreneurs to retain lower ownership 
stakes in the IPO while maintaining market valuation” (p.145).  Beatty (1989) found 
that “hiring of a ‘nationally known’ audit firm is related to less underpricing of an 
initial public offering of equity securities” (p.708). Consistent with Beatty (1989) and 
Firth and Liau-Tan (1998), Rock (1986), Beatty and Ritter (1986), Holland and 
Horton (1993) and Hogan (1997) also found that the hiring of a reputable auditor 
helps to ease underpricing.     
Menon and Williams (1991) contend that: 
“the reputation of the auditor is particularly likely to affect the perceived 
credibility of financial statements when a firm makes its initial public offering (IPO) 
of stock, Companies making IPOs typically are little known to investors, who, in the 
absence of alternative sources of information, must place substantial reliance on 
management’s reports.  If financial statement users differentiate between levels of 
auditor credibility, this should be more readily detected in the IPO market than in 
 
 
Contemporary Management Research  216 
 
 
 
markets for older, better-known companies” (p.314).    
Lee et al. (2003) examined the Australian IPO market prior to 1990 and explored 
the relationship between IPOs using one of a Big 8 accounting firms and the extent of 
voluntarily disclosure information. Lee et al. (2003) found that “IPO firms choosing a 
Big 8 auditor are less likely (rather than more) risky than those selecting a Non-Big 8 
auditor” (p.390).  Lee et al. (2003) add “…the use of a high quality auditor likely 
compliments the signalling value of increased voluntary disclosure” (p.398).   
Willenborg (1999) examined the demand for auditing in IPOs from the 
perspectives of the investors, the entrepreneurs and the auditors and argues that “the 
insurance demand for auditing is likely to dominate any information-based 
demand…even in the small-deal segment of the IPO market…” (p.237). Willenborg’s 
findings are in contrast with our findings that the smaller IPOs (<$10million) are less 
likely to adopt the independent accounting services from one of the Top 5 accounting 
firms.   
Although previous studies have traditionally explored the relationship between 
investor confidence and the choice of accounting firm made by IPOs for auditing 
services, they do provide a good basis for understanding the relationship between 
accounting firm reputation, the factors that may influence reputation and the choice of 
accounting firms in general made by IPOs.  Previous studies have consistently found 
there to be a positive relationship between the choice of accounting firm and increased 
consumer confidence. This paper draws on prior related work and extends it to 
analysing the relationship between the choice of independent accountant and the size, 
industry type and year of listing of industrial IPOs between 1994 and 2004. 
 
DATA AND FINDINGS 
The analysis conducted is based upon data collected from the Connect 4 
Prospectuses database. Accountancy firm and the total revenue turnover data came 
from the prospectuses of five hundred and seventy-four Australian industrial 
companies for the years 1994 to 2004.  As shown in Table 1, the majority of IPO 
companies used an accounting firm from the Top 5 accounting firms (61%) for their 
independent accounting needs.  It appears the majority of IPOs believed they would 
benefit most by using a Top 5 accounting firm. 
Table 2 reports the number of IPOs that used a Top 5 accounting firm according 
to size of the IPO. The data clearly shows that the smallest sized IPOs were less likely 
to use a Top 5 accounting firm (46% of IPOs raising less than $10million) than the 
biggest sized IPOs (96% of IPOs raising more than $80million). To test whether the 
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relationship between accounting firm choice (top 5 and other) and the size of the IPO 
capital raising is statistically significant we use a logit approach on the 574 
observations since the dependent variable of accounting firm choice is binary.  The 
model is as follows and the resultant coefficients and p-values (in brackets) are 
reported below.   
L:Pr(A=1) =  β0  + β1Totalmil +  ε                                                               (1) 
= 0.011 + 0.018Totalmil  
                                           (0.918)  (0.000) 
 
Table 1 Number of IPO companies from 1994 to 2004 that used one of the  
Top 5-accountancy firms for their independent accounting services. 
IPO Companies 
(1994 –2004) 
TOTAL 
Number 
No. of 
companies 
that used 
one of the 
Top  5 
accounting 
firms 
      % of 
companies 
that used 
one of the 
Top  5 
accounting 
firms 
No. of 
companies 
that did 
NOT use 
one of the 
Top   5 
accounting 
firms 
% of 
companies 
that did 
NOT use 
one of the 
Top   5 
accounting 
firms 
TOTALS 574 352 61% 222 39% 
 
Where L:Pr(A=1) indicates a logit functional form and Pr(A=1) indicates the 
equation is an estimate of the probability that a top 5 accounting firm (=1) is used 
Totalmil = the size of the equity capital raising in millions of $A. 
The positive sign on the estimated coefficient for Totalmil and the highly 
significant p-value suggests larger IPOs were more likely to have used a higher profile 
accounting firm.  This result is not surprising for two reasons. Firstly, the larger 
companies are endeavouring to attract a much larger amount of investors and capital 
and therefore aim to provide the greatest reassurance possible to potential investors by 
hiring one of the more reputable accounting firms.  Second, the larger companies are 
more likely to afford the services of one of the Top 5 accounting firms. 
Table 3 reports the number of IPO companies according to the universally 
recognised Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) that used a Top 5 
accounting firm.  Interestingly, the two most prevalent users of the Top 5 accounting 
firms for independent accounting services were the utilities group, #55, (78%) and the 
telecommunication services group, #50, (73%).  In part, this may be explained by the 
industry regulatory expectations on community services such as electricity, gas, water 
and telephone.  The next most prevalent users of the Top 5 independent accountants 
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were the industrials, #20, (65%). This group includes industries such as aerospace and 
defence, construction and engineering, airlines, road and rail, etcetera providing 
community and government services that are highly regulated and highly scrutinised 
by the public and therefore are more likely to need to use a reputable and high quality 
accounting firm.   
 
Table 2 Number of IPO companies from 1994 to 2004, according to size, that used a 
Top 5-accountancy firm. 
 
Table 3 Number of IPO companies from 1994 to 2004 in each Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) category that used a Top 5-accountancy firm  
Size of company 
by turnover 
$ 
Number of 
companies 
in this 
range 
No. of 
companies 
that used a 
Top  5 
accountancy 
firm 
% of 
companies 
that used a 
Top 5 
accountancy 
firm 
No. of 
companies 
that did 
NOT use a 
Top  5 
accountancy 
firm 
% of 
companies 
that did 
NOT use a 
Top 5 
accountancy 
firm  
<10million 283 131 46% 152 54%
10-29.99 million 148 97 66% 51 34%
30-79.99 million 76 60 79% 16 21%
>80 million 67 64 96% 3 4%
 TOTALS 574 352 61% 222 39%
Companies as per  
GICS category 
Number of 
companies 
in this 
group 
No. of 
companies 
that used a 
Top  5 
accountanc
y firm 
 % of 
companies 
that used a 
Top 5 
accountancy 
firm  
No. of 
companies 
that did 
NOT use a 
Top  5 
accountancy 
firm 
% of 
companies 
that did 
NOT use a 
Top  5 
accountancy 
firm  
# 15 Materials 16 8 50% 8 50%
# 20 Industrials 181 117 65% 64 35%
# 25 Consumer 
Discretionary 
107 67 63% 40 37%
# 30 Consumer Staples 33 16 48% 17 52%
# 35 Health Care 89 52 58% 37 42%
# 40 Financials 72 40 56% 32 44%
# 45 Information 
Technology 
16 8 50% 8 50%
# 50 Telecommunication  51 37 73% 14 27%
# 55 Utilities 9 7 78% 2 22%
TOTALS 574 352 61% 222 39%
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Table 3 reports that the remaining GICS category groups, except for the 
‘consumer staples’ group, had at least half of their total use a Top 5 accounting firm.  
Upon further investigation we found that the ‘consumer staples’ group includes a large 
percentage of small turnover firms (55% had a turnover of less than $10million).  The 
‘consumer staples group’ smaller percentage result (48%) is more likely to be the 
result of the size of the firms in this group rather than the industry type. 
Table 4 reports the number of IPO companies for each year between 1994 and 
2004 that used a Top 5 accountancy firm.  The findings reveal that from 1994 to 1999, 
at least 64% of IPOs used a Top 5 accounting firm but from the year 2000 until the 
year 2004 a decline in the use of the Top 5 accounting firms was evident showing that 
between 44% and 57% of IPOs used a Top 5 accounting firm.  The year 2002 reports 
the lowest percentage of users of a Top 5 accounting firm at 44%.  Reasons for this 
drop in usage after the year 2000 may be many but we speculate that the main reasons 
for the decline in using one of the Top 5 accounting firms are: 
1. the introduction of CLERP 9 and  
2. the demise of Arthur Andersen.2  
CLERP 9 is the ninth instalment of the Corporate Law Economic Reform 
Program (CLERP)3. CLERP was initiated in Australia in 1997 to allow for ongoing 
review and reform of regulation for Australia’s corporations and businesses and 
CLERP 9 was initiated in response to the HIH collapse in 2001 to address the 
regulations governing audit and independence requirements. The Australian 
government engaged Professor Ian Ramsay4 to “undertake a comprehensive review of 
Australia’s existing legislative and professional requirements on the independence of 
auditors” (The Department of the Treasury, 2002, p.41).  In brief, CLERP 9 requires 
auditors to meet a standard of independence and auditors will be required to rotate 
after five years (Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and 
Corporate Disclosure) Bill, 2003).  
We suppose that the timing of the new legislation in 1999 is associated with the 
decrease in the number of IPOs that used one of the Top 5 from the year 2000, as 
reported in  
Table 4.  The introduction of CLERP 9, in particular, that requires a rotation of 
auditors and enforces auditor independence by restricting external auditors to provide 
non-audit services to their clients, has possibly led IPOs to adopting independent 
                                            
2 Arthur Andersen collapsed in 2002. Prior to its demise, Arthur Andersen was one of the Top 5 accounting 
firms. 
3 CLERP was enacted in 1999 and is known as the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999. 
4 Professor Ramsay is in the Law school of Melbourne University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia. 
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accounting services from smaller to medium sized accounting firms to avoid any 
possible conflict of roles.     
Interestingly, however, CLERP (as distinct to CLERP 9) tightens regulations and 
“there have been significant increases in the level of prospectus stop orders issued by 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), the introduction of 
criminal penalties and on-the-spot fines imposed by ASIC” (Gallery et al., 2006, p.1).  
CLERP introduced a new chapter 6D to the Corporations Law that governs prospectus 
disclosures and associated penalties for false, misleading or omitted information.  We, 
therefore, would have thought that the timing of the new CLERP legislation in 1999 
would have been a greater drive for IPOs to adopt one of the Top 5 accounting firms. 
However, our findings reported a decline in the number of IPOs using a Top 5 
accounting firm from the year 2000, and it therefore seems that the introduction of 
CLERP 9 that legislates auditor independence, was possibly a more influential factor 
for IPOs in their choice of an independent accountant.  
 
 
Table 4 Number of IPO companies from 1994 to 2004, according to date of listing, 
that used a Top 5-accountancy firm. 
Year of IPO 
Listing 
Number of 
companies in 
this range 
No. of 
companies 
that used a 
Top  5 
accountancy 
firm 
% of 
companies 
that used a 
Top  5 
accountancy 
firm 
No. of 
companies 
that did NOT 
use a Top  5 
accountancy 
firm 
% of 
companies 
that did NOT 
use a Top  5 
accountancy 
firm 
1994 46 34 74% 12 26% 
1995 20 16 80% 4 20% 
1996 24 21 88% 3 12% 
1997 33 21 64% 12 36% 
1998 31 22 71% 9 29% 
1999 97 66 68% 31 32% 
2000 136 78 57% 58 43% 
2001 39 20 51% 19 49% 
2002 34 15 44% 19 56% 
2003 35 19 54% 16 46% 
2004 79 40 51% 39 49% 
TOTALS 574 352 61% 222 39% 
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The second reason we suggest to explain the decline in IPOs using a Top 5 
accounting firm after the year 2000 is the demise of Arthur Andersen.  Prior to the 
news in 2001 that Arthur Andersen was involved with the Enron scandal, companies 
viewed that “an audit conducted by a small and relatively unknown firm, therefore, 
may not be worth much” (Thies, 2002, p.1).  Thies (2002) adds, “the value of stock of 
the Big 5-audited public corporations seemed immune to such events” (p.1).  The 
Enron scandal was closely timed to an Australian disaster that also saw Arthur 
Anderson implicated.  The HIH insurance group was placed in provisional liquidation 
in early 2001 (The HIH Royal Commission, 2003) and companies were leaving 
Andersen’s in large numbers.  Thies (2002) said that “at least 143 corporate clients, 
out of 2,311, have left Andersen…” (p.1). It seems that those who left Andersen’s 
elected to adopt the services of accounting firms that did not belong to the Top 5 
group because the number of IPOs using a Top 5 accounting firm declined (see Table 
4), particularly in 2002 where the smallest percentage for the 1994 to 2004 period was 
recorded.  The trust and confidence in the Top 5 accounting firms had diminished and 
IPOs were looking elsewhere for independent accounting services.  This second 
reason may be the more plausible.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Previous studies investigating factors influencing the choice of auditor made by 
IPOs have mainly come from the USA (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Rock, 1986; Beatty, 
1989; Menon and Williams, 1991 and Willenborg, 1999). These studies found a 
correlation between hiring a reputable auditor and consumer confidence by exploring 
various factors such as a) size of IPO company, b) ex-ante uncertainty, c) underpricing 
and d) credibility of the financial statements of the IPO.  Our study contributes to the 
literature by exploring the relationship between the choice of independent accountants 
made by IPOs and the size of the company, the year of IPO listing and the category of 
industry type.  In particular, this study investigates which Australian industrial IPOs 
between the years of 1994 to 2004 were more likely to have used one of the Top 5 
accounting firms for their independent accounting needs. 
The findings of this research confirm that most IPOs are likely to adopt one of 
the Top 5 accounting firms as their independent accountant.  Not surprising the 
findings also confirmed that larger sized IPOs are more likely to adopt one of the Top 
5 accounting firms as their independent accountant than smaller sized IPOs. However, 
more surprisingly, the findings revealed that a lower proportion of industrial IPOs 
used one of the Top 5 accounting firms from the year 2000 and that some industry 
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types were more likely to use one of Top 5 accounting firms.  The year 2002 reported 
the lowest number of IPOs that used a Top 5 accounting firm (44%) and we speculate 
that this is related the demise of Arthur Andersen and the implication of Andersen in 
the downfall of some large companies.  Not only was there a diminishment in 
consumer confidence in the large accounting firms, but Andersen clients needed to 
look elsewhere for their independent accountant.  The industry type also seemed to be 
a factor in which accounting firm an IPO chose as their independent accountant.  The 
utilities group, the telecommunication group and the industrials group of IPOs were 
the most prevalent users of one of the Top 5 accounting firms.  We speculate that 
these findings are related to the industry regulatory expectations of these groups, and 
therefore IPOs in these groups are more likely to use a more reputed accounting firm.   
Whilst the USA studies have directed their research to the choice of audit firm chosen 
by IPOs, our research has focused on the choice of independent accountant made by 
Australian IPOs. The findings of our research for Australian IPOs does coincide in 
principle with the USA findings that reputation of the accounting firm does have a 
favourable impact on IPOs. 
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